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Abstract
Containers and virtualmachines are being adopted to develop embedded Linux
Internet-of-Things applications. Consumer Internet-of-Things devices havebeen
notoriously insecure due to loss of continued software support. To help pre-
vent this, we propose the ‘kill switch’ pattern. By defining operation levels
for microservice-based virtualized application components and their respec-
tive communication paths, application functionality can be dynamically modi-
fied to an essential state. This thesis contributes: a formalized definition of the
proposed design pattern for virtualizedmicroservice applications; and an algo-
rithm for handling the operation level mode change. We illustrate with three
example realizations: a generic microservice-based model-view-controller ap-
plication, an example system utilizing the Suricata intrusion detection system
to generate events, and a modified Docker Engine implementation. Use cases,
scenarios, and general application design processes are discussed, with sug-
gested areas of future work.
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For some given system, there should be a way to stop the system from caus-
ing harm in an emergency situation. For example, treadmills have a rope that
attaches the user to a kill switch. If the rope is pulled out, such as when the
user falls, the treadmill stops and prevents the user from further injury. This
principle is also widely used in machining tools, such as with lathes or milling
machines. A kill switch is designed to prevent such harm, or stop unintended
effects of operation of some system.
Traditionally, embedded systems were designed for secured environments
like on-site industrial automation systems. With the recent increase of popu-
larity of automation systems with consumers, embedded systems have been
tasked with higher amounts of processing, while maintaining persistent con-
nections with remote cloud systems. This has increased the demand for edge
systems, and solutions revolving around the Internet of Things (IoT). As such,
the rigor and standards required in an industrial automation systemhave been
cast aside in favour of a less rigorous ‘consumer-focused’ approach.
Unfortunately, there havebeen several instances of these Internet-connected
devices causing harm. Examples include:
• Nest Thermostats losing functionality in winter [1],
• devices infectedwith theMirai botnet attacking largeDNSproviderswhich
disabled a large part of the Internet on the east coast [2],
• Jeep vehicles being taken offline remotely [3],
• and smart home hubs allowing remote code execution [4]
Should the trend of automating consumer-based products via this method
continue, the safety of end users is at serious risk. Furthermore, a major secu-
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rity concern is that once a devicemanufacturer no longer updates the software
for a system, it will eventually be rendered useless or dangerous as exploits are
discovered. The ability to rapidly deploy updates to fleets of systems, or entire
consumer lines of products, has been a source of both interest and contention
for IoT adoption.
1.1 Motivation
Containers are an increasingly popular method of adding significant isolation
capabilities to various types of systems. Containers, or operating-system-level
virtualization, differ from ‘regular’ virtual machines (VM) and hypervisors (HV).
In contrast to HVs, which provide abstractions for subdivision of ‘raw’ base
system resources to VMs running full operating systems, containers leverage
isolation techniques provided by operating system facilities. This allows for
‘lighter’ virtualization, especially when considering the reuse of base operat-
ing system kernel resources by the containers themselves. As a result, con-
tainers can be optimized to require less system resources in comparison to a
VM. For example, virtualization of an entire guest operating system or guest
filesystem is not required with containers. Furthermore, techniques such as
copy-on-write filesystems can be implemented to further reduce their resource
requirements.
Containers and associated platforms are rapidly being adopted for enter-
prise cloud workloads and application development. Some examples of cur-
rent container platform implementations include Linux Containers (LXC1), and
Docker2. According to a Jan 2018 RightScale survey [5], Docker container adop-
tion has increased from35% in 2017 to 49% in 2018. As a result of this adoption,
a robust ecosystem has developed around Docker.
The rapid adoption of containers can be attributed to the value proposi-
tion of microservice architecture (MSA). MSA, as described in [6] and [7], is an
adaptation of service-oriented architecture (SOA). In comparison to SOA, and
in contrast to ‘monolithic’ architecture, MSA divides an application into “a suite
of small services, each running in its own process and communicating with
1https://linuxcontainers.org/2https://www.docker.com/resources/what-container
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lightweight mechanisms, often an hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) resource
application programming interface (API). These services are built around busi-
ness capabilities and independently deployable by fully automateddeployment
machinery” [6].
Combined IoT markets are estimated to grow from $235 billion in 2017 to
$520 billion in 2021 [8], with top concerns of adoption being security at 45%,
and difficulties integrating IT with operational technology at 34% [9]. The com-
bination of resource isolation, security isolation, and evolving development
operations practices make containers particularly well-suited for Internet-of-
Things (IoT) devices. For example, an IoT device can deploy multiple containers
on the same device – this allows for higher utilization of bare-metal resources,
as well as edge or fog computing application scenarios. balenaEngine3, a fork
of the Docker engine, is an example of an IoT-focused container engine. Hypri-
otOS4 and balenaOS5 are examples of Linux operating systems focused on
running container engines for embedded and IoT devices. Also, Docker has re-
cently addedmulti-architecture build support directly into their image pipeline.
This includes support for ARM devices, amongst others. [10]
Rancher Labs have developed a distribution of Kubernetes6 called k3s tar-
geting resource-constrained environments. Like Kubernetes, there are many
methods and architecture styles for deploying k3s.
The advantages of leveraging virtualization in IoT systems present new pos-
sibilities. Due to how applications are developed when using “proper” con-
tainer application architecture patterns, such asmicroservice architecture (MSA),
subsets of critical functionality can be kept isolated in separate containers. This
can allow for all non-essential containers to be shut down or killed. This re-
sults in serious considerations for MSA pattern development. As evidenced by
adoption of containers, the infrastructure of systems are becoming synony-
mous with application architectures. By considering the software packaging
systems as part of the definition of the application architecture itself, we have
identified a pattern – the kill switch pattern. When a developer is creating a
MSA application, functionality can be separated out into discrete services. By
3https://www.balena.io/engine/4https://blog.hypriot.com/5https://www.balena.io/os/6https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/what-is-kubernetes/
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identifying and isolating essential application functionality, and the services as-
sociated with this required functionality, an application can be developed such
that it removes unnecessary application functionality. For example, this is use-
ful in a security scenario; surface area of an application can be reduced in a
compromised state, while retaining critical functionality.
We specifically target this design pattern at IoT systems for a few reasons.
Given the operating environment of IoT systems, compute resources are lim-
ited. An IoT system does not have the luxury of scaling out functionality, or
the processing power to analyze large amounts of data. In the situation of an
external threat, it ismuch easier to lock the systemdown than it is to prevent at-
tacks. Another reason is if an IoT system is battery operated, one would expect
that the system would reduce ‘nice-to-have’ functionality for the sake of bat-
tery life. Also, IoT systems are notoriously difficult to keep updated, especially
if a vendor discontinues support. This approach would allow development of a
‘fail-safe’ mode, preserving baseline functionality, or allow for the deployment
of general-purpose containers. Alternatively, this approach also lends itself to
the deployment of general-purpose services that are much easier to keep up-
dated.
By implementing the kill switch pattern, device manufacturers would gain
several advantages. First, devices would be easier to maintain due to the de-
composition of services as defined by microservice architecture. Second, clear
dependency tracing would be achieved, which is a serious limitation of mi-
croservice architecture. Third, the device would be able to utilize the kill switch
architecture to reduce application functionality to a desired state - that is, should
the application architect design the application to have several levels, desired
service of IoT devices would be able to continue in a reduced state should the
application require it.
Likewise, end-users would gain several advantages via implementation of
the kill switch pattern. Should an event cause ‘smart’ functionality of the device
to fail, the device could be developed such that base functionality continues.
Furthermore, in conjunction with a mode change mechanism,
This approach in not limited to containers alone. Any system utilizing MSA
can benefit from this pattern regardless of deployment method, such as in IoT
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projects leveraging on-device virtual machines such as Project ACRN7.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis contributes:
• a formalized definition of the design pattern for virtualized microservice
applications,
• an algorithm for handling a mode change, utilizing the pattern,
• an analysis of the pattern,
• example architectures:
– a generic microservice-based model-view-controller application
– an example system utilizing the Suricata intrusion detection system
to generate event
– an example implementation of themode switch in the Docker engine
API
1.3 Outline
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides back-
ground information and related work on virtualization, containers, container
patterns, cloud patterns, microservice architecture, IoT application architec-
tures, and safety-critical systems patterns. Chapter 3 defines the pattern using
set and graph definitions, defines an algorithm for a mode change, and anal-
yses the pattern. Chapter 4 demonstrates realizations of the pattern, and is
supplemented by discussion. Chapter 5 provides a brief conclusion, with sug-
gested areas of future work.
7https://projectacrn.org/
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2. Background and Related Work
In this section, we review required background information, and works related
to the kill switch pattern. We begin with a background on hypervisors and vir-
tual machines, a background on containers and related work of their patterns,
a backgroundofmicroservice architecture and relatedwork in the area of cloud
design patterns, a background of IoT, and background on safety-critical sys-
tems. We then discuss related works more explicitly, and the relations they
have to the kill switch pattern.
2.1 Hypervisors and Virtual Machines
In order to discuss virtualization methods, some concept overviews are re-
quired.
• Bare-Metal: Bare-metal (or native) refers to a set of dedicated hardware
that an application, operating system (OS), or other software, may run on
— i.e., there is no method of virtualization. [11]
• Virtual Machine (VM): A VM is an isolated system that runs in the same
way a non-virtualized machine would, except it can only access and uti-
lize ‘virtualized’ resources provisioned to it by some hardware abstraction
layer. These resources appear normally to the VM.
• Hypervisor (HV): A hypervisor is a hardware abstraction layer platform
that manages and distributes resources to virtualized guest components.
Resources include processor, memory, hard-drive space, or peripherals.
A hypervisor may run directly on bare-metal (Type 1), or in an OS (Type
2) [11]
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• Host: A host is a systemor platform for a virtualized component to run on.
The term is often used interchangeably to refer to the bare-metal instance
a hypervisor or other platform runs on, the OS a virtualized component
runs on, or other similar concepts. For example, a hypervisor is a host for
guest virtualized components.
• Guest: A guest is a virtualized component which is managed by or run on
a host, and is provided some abstracted host resources.
Maximum utilization of bare-metal compute resources is a significant con-
cern from a cost and efficiency viewpoint. By using virtualization concepts,
bare-metal resources can be divided and utilized by a set of virtualized compo-
nents [12] [13]. Typical use cases include isolated development environments
on a developer’s workstation, or deployment of multiple virtualized application
servers across clustered bare-metal resources managed by a hypervisor.
Virtualization also allows for easier and cost-effective implementation of
high-availability, fault-tolerant, scalable, systems. Furthermore, local area net-
works (LANs) and bare-metal network appliances such as switches, routers,
etc., can be virtualized as well. This results in implementations like virtual LANS
(VLANs) and software-defined networks (SDNs), respectively. These techniques
can be used to further isolate and manage communications between virtual-
ized components [12].
2.2 Containers
The current idiomatic definition of a container refers to the concept put for-
ward by Soltesz et al. [13], which combine two separate ideas: resource con-
tainers, a method of subdividing system resources; and security containers, a
method of isolating processes from the base operating system. In Linux, the
usual way of implementing security container functionality is with namespaces,
and resource containers with control groups.
Containers are a variation of the sandbox concept, as described by Gold-
berg, Wagner, Thome, and Brewer in 1996 [14], and have been implemented
in a variety of ways. Some notable instances include chroot jails, FreeBSD
jails as described by Kamp and Watson in 2000 [15], Security-Enhanced Linux’s
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(SELinux) implementation as described by Loscocco and Smalley in 2001 [16],
Solaris Zones as described by Price and Tucker in 2004 [17], amongst others.
A namespace is, according to the Linux Programmer’s Manual [18], an ab-
stractions of a global system resource that only allownamespaceprocessmem-
bers isolated access to the global resource instance. Of particular interest are
user namespaces, which were introduced to the Linux kernel in 2008. Accord-
ing to the Linux Programmer’s Manual [19], user namespaces allow for dif-
ferent ‘perspectives’ relating to security-related identifiers and attributes (user
IDs, group IDs, root directory, capabilities, etc.).
Container resource management of host Linux operating system resources
are performed using control groups (cgroups). Cgroups are hierarchies of pro-
cesses [20]. These hierarchies are then able to have resources limited or al-
tered based on each type using associated subsystems/resource controllers.
Example resources controlled by these subsystems includeCPU,memory, num-
ber of processes, and process suspension/resumption.
2.2.1 Container Design Patterns
Burns and Oppenheimer describe and formalize a set of emergent design pat-
terns for container-based systems in [21]. They assert there are three types of
patterns:
• single-container management patterns
• single-node, multi-container application patterns
• multi-node application patterns
Burns and Oppenheimer assert [21] that containers provide many of the
benefits of object-oriented programming. The authors also assert that using
containers as units have the following advantages: resource accounting and
allocation, packaging, reuse, inherent failure containment boundary, and ease
of deployment.
Single container patterns revolve around one container on one node. The
patterns involve the following components: a management interface for the
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container, the boundary of a container, and lifecycle of a container. The man-
agement interface can be simple (running, stopping, pausing), or extended us-
ing an exposed API internal to the container. Burns and Oppenheimer assert
that similar to objects in object-oriented programming, containers can expose
as much information as a developer would like. Furthermore, lifecycle opera-
tions can be as simple as immediately killing containers, to complex series of
events such as allowing in-flight transactions to complete, closing connections,
and gracefully stopping. [21]
Single-node, multi-container application patterns involve one system hosting
multiple containers. The authors identify three patterns: sidecar, ambassador,
and adaptor. [21]
The sidecar pattern involves a main container, and a sidecar container that
extends or augments the functionality of the main container. The authors pro-
vide an example web server serving static content, and a sidecar that periodi-
cally updates the static content from a Git repository.
The ambassador pattern involves a main container and a container used to
proxy communication to the main container.
The adaptor pattern involves taking heterogeneous interfaces for different
containers or services, and providing somemethod or strategy for homogeniz-
ing the interface to the application as a whole.
Multi-node application patterns involve multiple nodes running 1..n contain-
ers. Often, these reflect typical distributed system patterns. However, their
implementation vary based on the characteristics of containers. [21]
The leader election pattern involves using a set of application containers re-
quiring leader election. In distributed systems, a replica set may elect a ‘leader’
to handle functionality, and are traditionally implemented at the application
layer via a library. However, Burns and Oppenheimer assert that the imple-
mentation is difficult. Instead, leader-election containers present a simplified
HTTP API to one another for use in leader election. [21]
The work queue pattern allows an application developer to treat a special-
ized container as a job, to allow for tasks to execute in a language-agnostic fash-
ion. Using this approach, the queue itself can be implemented in any generic
language or framework. [21]
The scatter/gather pattern involves a root node, which fans a request out
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to a set of leaf processing nodes. Given a generic interface, a merge container
that manages client interaction, can send the request to ‘leaf’ containers in par-
allel. The merge container then gathers and merges the results from the leaf
containers. [21]
The hierarchy and grouping of the patterns helps to put ours in a frame of
reference, and the pattern definitions themselves are of importance as they
provide context to each pattern type grouping. In other words, we are able to
categorize realization styles of our pattern using these types.
2.3 Microservice Architecture Pattern
In MSA, applications components are separated out into individual services. [6]
These services are developed around ‘business capabilities’. This allows teams
to develop microservices independently, using tools, languages, and software
suites of their choosing. This also allows for evolution of the capability of the
system. MSA enables new services to be added or removed in a variety of
ways. Services communicate over dumb pipes, avoiding the complexity of tra-
ditional middleware solutions. Usually, services are responsible for their own
data management, avoiding a single point of data failure as in the case of tra-
ditional database systems. These systems are designed for fault tolerance and
failure; MSA tries to account for individual service failures. This is usually done
via scaling, fail over, or auto-recovery. Services are deigned to be deployed
using automated systems and pipelines. [6]
Major advantages of MSA include enforced separation of application con-
cerns (data, logic, andpresentation, for example), auto-scaling, high availability,
and continuous delivery and deployment. Additionally, services are designed
to be immutable; that is, the services are not treated as special deployments
that require special configuration for each instance. They are aimed at being
redeployed on a regular basis with little to no manual intervention. Contain-
ers are a primary method of developing and deploying services using this pat-
tern. [22]
In a particular study from the academic literature, [23], Akbulut and Per-
ros conduct a performance analysis of microservice design patterns. However,
each of their implementations varies significantly. They developed three case
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studies using three different patterns. The first used an API gateway pattern,
which includes a single entrypoint API gateway that implements routing and ag-
gregation of all services. Akbulut and Perros state the major advantage of this
pattern is gateway offloading and circuit breaking.The next case study imple-
mented the chain of responsibility pattern. In short, output from one service
becomes input for another. The third pattern implemented the asynchronous
messaging pattern, utilizing a messaging bus for asynchronous communica-
tion between services. The authors state that state that similar applications
implemented using different patterns have trade-offs between overhead, per-
formance, and cost. Akbulut and Perros assert that the API gateway is most
flexible. They conclude that no one pattern is ‘the best’, and that each pattern
is better suited for different scenarios.
TheMSA pattern has several key associated patterns aimed at cloud deploy-
ments. These are discussed in Section 2.3.1, in the context of our kill switch pat-
tern. IoT specific MSA topics from academic literature are outlined in Section
2.4.1.
2.3.1 Cloud Design Patterns
Cloud design patterns are extremely compatible withMSA. Resources provided
by Microsoft offer a fantastic description of these patterns, most of which are
directly compatible with MSA, and include significant overlap with ‘traditional’
distributed system patterns. However, some patterns are preferable in mi-
croservice environments. We have selected useful examples for this thesis in
this section. These are referenced in the following chapters to further explain
our pattern.
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, the sidecar pattern involves a secondary ser-
vice that performs peripheral or accenting tasks to a main service or applica-
tion. This service is independent of the main service. Examples of functional-
ity include platform abstraction, proxying connections, logging, and configura-
tion. [24]
The retry pattern is a a method of preventing failures of requests in the case
of transient errors of services. Requests are wrapped to perform a retry, retry
after delay, or cancel in order to handle the transient errors gracefully. For
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example, if service A has transient issues, service B can retry communicating
with service A until it is successful.
The circuit breaker pattern is similar to the retry pattern. It utilizes the retry
pattern, but prevents repeated retries in the case of a likely-to-fail service re-
quest. In short, it assumes that the request will fail, where the retry pattern
expects it to succeed. The circuit breaker determines if the error is transient
or not, and either backs off retry requests or cancels the attempts all together.
A proxy utilizing a state machine with closed, half-open, and open states is an
example implementation. [25]
The ambassador pattern involves an ‘ambassador’ to a main service, either
co-located with a service or in a separate sidecar service. It is used to send
network requests on behalf of another service, and is often used with legacy
applications to offload client tasks such as monitoring, logging, and security.
Some example of ambassador functionality include connecting to a service reg-
istry to find actual endpoint location, measure request latency, or for building
a common set of client connectivity functionality. [26]
The bulkhead pattern involves partitioning services into groups based on
load and availability. If a consumer of multiple services tries to repeatedly con-
nect to a failing service and alive services, it can cause cascading failures to
all services due to resource exhaustion waiting for response from the failed
service. By grouping services, it allows for preservation of some functionality
in the event of one service failure. An example implementation is replicating
services so that consumers have multiple service instances to connect to. [27]
While not necessarily a cloud pattern, feature flags are a useful pattern in
this context. While developing an application or service, certain functionality
can be wrapped in a toggle switch. This allows for a specific feature, or set of
features, to be enabled or disabled. It also allows for new functionality to be
switched in, in place of existing functionality. This is helpful for a canary release,
where new services or software are introduced to a system gradually. [28] [29]
2.4 Internet of Things
As mentioned in Section 1, a main inhibitor of IoT adoption is security. While
not a complete security solution [7], containerization has inherent security iso-
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lation which raises the cost of attacks and reduces surface area. As also men-
tioned in Section 1, IT operation integration is another major inhibitor of IoT
development [9]. Existing and in-development tooling around containers and
MSA, such as orchestration platforms, will likely help ease the development
and deployment process.
2.4.1 IoT and Microservices
In [30], Santana, Alencar, and Prazeres conducted a systematic mapping study
of 18 sources from academic literature to identify research on microservices
and the IoT. They identify several contributions to the area, and state their
future work includes applying architectural properties of microservices to ad-
dress the challenges of IoT. The shows an interest in the area, which helps val-
idate our research.
In [31], Butzin, Golatowski, and Timmermann discuss best practices of mi-
croservices, and compare them to IoT principles. They compare across self-
containment,monitoring and fault cascading, choreography andorchestration,
containers, and versioning of services. The authors note the similarities be-
tween IoT SOA and microservices, but state that they both approach similar
results from differing directions.
In [32], Al-Masri explores the topic of industrial IoT and quality of service
for microservices. The author measures the response time, throughput, avail-
ability, reliability, and cost of each microservice to create a measure of quality
of service, and developed a middleware solution to centralize logging of this
information. They assert that this framework “measures the overall quality of
microservices for possible integration in IIoT applications”. In their future work,
they state they plan on including a ranking mechanism to track service qual-
ity over time. Our pattern could be considered an example of their proposed
ranking mechanism that is abstracted to be general purpose.
2.4.2 Performance Overhead of Containers on IoT Devices
Due to the nature of IoT devices, compute resources are limited. In several
studies targeting typical IoT devices, container performance overheadwasdemon-
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strated to be objectively minimal. This suggests that they are ideal for IoT de-
vices.
In [33], Morabito performed an in-depth analysis of the effects of Docker
containerization on several types of single-board computers (SBC), and empir-
ically demonstrated that there was negligible impact on CPU, memory, disk
I/O, and mixed workload performance. Network performance was shown to
be impacted negatively when using the default NAT method, but near native
performance when using host networking.
In [34], Noronha, Riegel, Lang, and Bauschert implement a similar perfor-
mance testing methodology as [33], but investigate using LXC as the container
technology, and target devices with various chipsets. Devices include routers,
and IoT development board, and a SBC. Noronha, Riegel, Lang, and Bauschert
assert there is negligible impact on CPU and memory performance, and com-
parable network throughput and round-trip times when using Macvlan for the
container network interface.
Mendki [35], in an analysis of Docker containers usage in IoT edge video
analytics, demonstrated that the overhead of containerization was objectively
minimal. The authors alsomeasured the average load timeofmachine learning
models, and foundnegligible difference betweenbare-metal and containerized
performance.
Considering these studies, it is likely that containers will be further devel-
oped, specialized, and adopted for a wide variety of IoT use cases. Of note,
enterprise cloud adoption of containers is likely to lead to cross-development
of patterns and solutions.
2.4.3 Example IoT Container Architectures
In [36], Ismail et al. analyze Docker in the context of an edge computing plat-
form. The authors evaluated based on the following criteria: deployment and
termination, resource and service management, fault tolerance, and caching.
To demonstrate, they define a set of use cases, developed an application satis-
fying the use cases. While Docker has developed significantly since the paper
was published,Ismail et al. assert that Docker is a viable candidate especially
when compared to VMs.
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Morabito et al. [33] describe a platform architecture for smart cars. To
demonstrate, they analyze the feasibility of a Docker-enabled SBC system con-
nected to the vehicle via the OBD interface. They implement the application
using a variety of containers assigned one of four priority types: critical, high,
moderate, and low.
Garcia et al. [37] demonstrate a container-based architecture for industrial
robot control. Using Docker and the architectural model specified by the IEC-
61499 standard, the authors developed and implemented an architecture called
‘flexible container architecture’ for a KUKA youBot robot. They utilized several
containers: a control manager container for other container orchestration, a
robot operating system control container, and a set of application containers
used for specific functionality. Garcia et al. assert this architecture addresses
legacy emulation and deployment of flexible functionality.
Alam et al. [38] built an example architecture by splitting cloud, fog, and
edge tiers using microservices comprised of Docker containers. The different
layers communicated using a message hub, with edge and gateway devices
acting as Docker ‘workers’, and the cloudmaintaining responsibility for orches-
tration.
In [39], Noor et al. proposed IoTDoc, which is a Docker-container based
architecture for IoT-enabled cloud systems. Noor et al. assert that this archi-
tecture creates a ‘mobile cloud’ comprised of containers running on distributed
IoT devices. At a very high level, the architecture is comprised of three primary
components: a cloud manager responsible for analysis of existing resources,
as well as state management of swarm managers; a swarm manager respon-
sible for collections of nodes, analyzing node resources such as CPU, memory,
and sensors, sends images of tasks to the nodemanager, and tracks work done
by the nodemanager; and a nodemanager responsible for lifecycle operations
of task containers, and resource allocation for containers.
2.5 Safety-Critical Systems and Patterns
Hobbs asserts [40] that major safety-critical system architectural and design
patterns can be categorized as follows:
• error detection, including anomaly detection
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• error handling
• replication and diversification
Hobbs asserts that [40] by selecting from these patterns acknowledges a
‘balancing act’ between ‘tensions’. For example, a system can be extremely
safe by not doing anything; however, the system would not be useful. These
‘tensions’ are outlined as follows:
• availability and reliability
• usefulness and safety
• security, performance, and safety
• performance and reliability
• implementation concerns, such as readability versus performance
Our approach is most in line with error handling set of design patterns. In
particular, [40] outlines the “design safe state pattern”. The design safe state
is a mitigation of known or unknown system factors that cause unwanted be-
haviour in the system. The design safe state is a state which the system can
‘fall back’ to in the case of some unknown situation. Returning to the tread-
mill example from Chapter 1, the design safe state is where the treadmill is
no longer moving or providing power to actuators. Hobbs states that it “must
be externally visible in an unambiguous manner, [...] must be entered within
a predefined, and published, time of the condition being detected, [...] [and]
must be documented in the safety manual so that a designer using the com-
ponent can incorporate it into a larger design” [40].
2.6 Patterns and Methods Similar to Kill Switch
With these elements in mind, our approach synthesizes and adapts trends ap-
proaches from three key areas: cloud design patterns applicable to microser-
vice architectures, safety-critical patterns, and IoT container architectures. We
outline approaches and related workmost applicable to our pattern in this sec-
tion.
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Utilizing the categorization of container patterns outlined in [21], we assert
that our pattern is applicable to containers systems using single-node, multi-
container deployments. While the categorization is helpful for definition pur-
poses, our pattern is not singularly applicable to containers. Due to howMSA is
defined in [6], and by using containers as an expression of services, we assert
that our pattern is an addition to MSA architecture patterns as listed in 2.3.1.
In particular, our pattern is similar to the bulkhead pattern. However, the bulk-
head pattern only considers how to mitigate instances of failing services, and
does not consider the dependency of how services interact.
From the safety-critical systems domain, our pattern is similar to the “safe
state pattern” as outlined by [40]. However, we assert that we define multiple
‘safe-states’; as such, our pattern is quite different. It is also less rigorous in
terms of the required qualities outlined by Hobbs. This is explored in more
detail in Section 3.6.4.
In terms of IoT architectures, our approach focuses on the general imple-
mentation of on-device services. The architectures in 2.4.3 focus on specific im-
plementation solutions to common IoT problem spaces. Of particular interest
is work outlined by Morabito et al. in [33] and in Section 2.4.3. In this work, the
authors discuss the usage of containers as an enabling technology for smart
cars. The authors developed a test architecture for ‘accentuating’ services, such
as infotainment, cameras, and insurance. The authors split containers based





To our knowledge, this is the only instance of ‘ranking’ services based on
their priority in the container-based IoT domain. Our pattern, while developed
before knowledge of this architecture, takes a similar approach. However, the
authors do not extend it as a reusable approach to the concerns of IoT devices.
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3. Kill Switch Design Pattern
This chapter provides context for the pattern, the problem addressed, assump-
tions about the system the pattern is realized in, the definition of the pattern,
an overviewof themode change, and analysis of the pattern. Throughout these
sections, we highlight key concepts of the definition. To reduce ambiguity, set
notation and graph notation are used to define and describe the pattern in
detail.
3.1 Context
The concept for the pattern arose from several trends happening in the IT in-
dustry and IoT device architecture. There has been a clear push toward wide-
spread adoption of virtualization technologies for at least the past twodecades.
One of the more recent additions – containers – has led to the ability for deep
software stacks to be started and stopped very quickly, and treated similarly to
objects as opposed to stand-alone servers. IoT devices have begun adopting
virtualization for a variety of use cases, including containers.
Froma software architecture standpoint, the use of virtualized systemshave
inherent boundaries – the network interface of the device, or shared storage
of the virtualized systems. By utilizing these inherent boundaries, the applica-
tion can be structured into units. This leads to microservice architecture, as
outlined in Section 2.3.
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3.2 Problem
IoT devices have suffered from various security breaches, and this is largely
due to systems no longer being updated. Should the system no longer be con-
nected to the Internet, for example, the baseline functionality of the device
should be retained.
For example, consider a consumer smart oven developed by the fictional
Banana Corporation. The smart oven is built using a set of microservices: a
hardware interface service, a scheduler service, a cloud connection service,
an updater service, an internet gateway service, and a telemetry service. This
smart oven is given away with new home developments, and as such is ex-
tremely popular. However, a few days after Banana Corporation goes out of
business due to lawsuits, a security vulnerability is discovered that allows an
attacker to remotely control the oven via the cloud connection service. This
is a nightmare scenario. One would expect that the device should continue
to operate as a basic oven, and that the smart oven would stop attempting to
connect to the cloud after the company goes out of business. However, now an
attacker has access to a stove that could burn down a house. If the developers
had decided to add a kill switch to stop all unessential services, and triggered
it just before the company went out of business, this scenario would be much
less concerning.
3.3 Assumptions
Wemake a few assumptions about the pattern and deployment methods. The
deployment method of resulting architectures utilizing this pattern are built
from individually deployable services. This includes runtimes required to run
components of an application, and are isolated from other processes that may
be running on the same system. In short, this means containers, microkernel-
based operating systems, virtual machines, and unikernels.
Because services are isolated units, and because they have inherent bound-
aries, there should be some method of altering services states to modify ap-
plication functionality. Then, given some monitor listening for events, there
should be some way to trigger the change in application functionality.
19
Concept 1 Given some external event, the MSA-based application should be able
to adapt to operate using a predefined set of critical functionality, without signifi-
cant alteration or modification to source code. That is, super sets and subsets of
application functionality should be able to operate and exist, in multiple modes of
operation, based on developer-defined levels of critical functionality.
While this pattern is technically applicable to any type of MSA system, the
target of this pattern is a resource-constrained environment. The results of the
pattern is that at any given time, the system can be reduced so only the bare
essential services are running at any given time.
3.3.1 Features, Functionality, and Communication
For clarity we make some assumptions about the distinction between feature
and function.
Concept 2 For the purposes of this pattern, we define features as a holistic mea-
sure based on requirements of the consumer of system output. Functionality is the
expected outputs of the system, such that it is codified, consumable, and may have
side effects on other parts of a system.
Functionality is provided either passively as in a subscription model, or trig-
gered some external input as in an API call. While features are an important
part of any system, the pattern is only concerned with functionality. As an ex-
ample, a function of a desktop computer is that it can turn on and off, and a
feature is that it has a power button to turn it on and off.
Concept 3 We assert that systems operate by combining the results of separate in-
ternal, and optionally external, communication ‘sub-functionality’ outputs together
to provide some set of resultant functionality. In order to access the results of a sys-
tem, and thereby its functionality, at least one method of external communication
is required.
If the system is ‘closed’ and does not provide external functionality, while it
may be valid, it is useless.
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As such, for systems that require external communication, we need to de-
fine systemboundaries. This boundary starts and endswith the availablemeth-
ods of invoking functionality of the services. This would be ports, for example.
MSA relies on lightweightmethods of interprocess communication. In order
to reduce complexity, we do not consider the properties of protocols used to
deliver data or functionality between services. For example, we do not consider
a message being posted to a message bus with TCP as a bi-directional set of
communication due to the SYN/SYN-ACK/ACK handshake.
3.3.2 Services, Microservices, and Containers
The definition of services andmicroservices is quite broad in the literature. We
define them here for clarity and to avoid ambiguity in the following sections.
A virtual machine is a system that operates using subdivided ‘bare-metal’
resources. They virtualize the entire operating system or appliance, without
reusing resources from other parts of the system the ‘guests’ run on.
A container, as defined in Section 2.2, is a method of isolating a process and
constraining available resources to it. Containers are typically implemented
in Linux, and utilize the base Linux kernel to run the process. This allows for
various distributions or stand-alone runtimes to be used as the ‘base’ of the
container. It is a method of ‘light’ virtualization, as resources from the ‘host’
operating system can be reused in the ‘guest’ container.
Services, in the typical view of a SOA system, are monolithic service compo-
nents. Several services are combined to provide application functionality. Ser-
vices typically use shared storage and a shared communication bus. As such,
traditional services are harder to maintain as the code-base for a service is
tightly-coupled, and highly dependent on multiple single points of failure.
A microservice, as defined in Section 2.3, are a variation of SOA. Microser-
vices are individually deployable services. Microservices are developed around
‘business capabilities’, and have full autonomyover data storage, tools, and lan-
guages. The communicate over dumb pipes, or simple communication meth-
ods such as REST APIs. Microservices should be implemented such that the
communication path makes sense; via HTTP requests, or communication over
message busses. Also, data should be stored per microservice; that is, each
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service is responsible for its own data. This allows for easier replication, scal-
ing, and resiliency.
A microservice can be implemented in a variety of ways. Specifically, using
containers as an example, a microservice can be implemented either via one
container for the entiremicroservice, ormultiple tightly-coupled containers for
an individual microservice. As such, there is not necessarily a one-to-one map-
ping of one container to one microservice. Similarly, virtual machines can be
used to createmicroservices in the sameway; one-to-one, or one-to-many. It is
preferable to separatemicroservices out to several components to enable eas-
ier deployment of the microservice. However, this comes with the drawback of
increased resource utilization and interprocess communication.
In the kill switch, we are concerned with the component-level organization
of the system. Specifically, we consider the components of a microservice ar-
chitecture. We define these components as services throughout the following
sections. A microservice architecture is comprised of one or many microser-
vices. For our definition, we use the term service to define a ‘component’ of the
microservice architecture, such that it provides some functionality to the system.
In other words, services provide a service to the application itself. Services can
be viewed as either the individual components that create several microser-
vices, or the individual microservices that communicate with one another. In
either view, and the definition and pattern still holds. With the introduction of
the mode change mechanism, we kill either microservices, or components of
microservices.
We assume that the overall system architecture follows good microservice
design, such that functionality of microservices are loosely coupled, and orga-
nized by ‘higher level’ functionality. We also assume that at least one ‘microser-
vice’ exists on the system.
3.4 Definition
The pattern itself is straight-forward: we have a single device running appli-
cation architecture using services as the internal building blocks. Services are
defined asmicroservices, as described in Section 2.3, where each service is able
to deployed as an individual unit. Service can combine to become a microser-
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vice, or the entire device could be viewed as a microservice.
Each service has a potential method of communicating with other services.
Likewise, each service can also communicate with external systems or services.
Because the internal services are standalone units, they can be removed from
the system at any time. As such, the application can be built into tiers of func-
tionality, as any service can become an external communication point, and any
service can perform myriads of functionality in a self-contained way. By killing
separate tiers, the system gains the ability to reduce its attack surface area,
and energy consumption.
Concept 4 Via some switch event event, a set of services providing some set of func-
tionality, and their individual states, shall be alterable at run time to provide some
reduced, minimum, or altered set of services and functionality. The application ar-
chitecture resulting from accounting for this pattern consideration should have the
ability to enable multiple modes of overall application operation. For example, in
an application where both critical and non-critical containers are deployed, a mode
change would ensure critical functionality is preserved.
For example, suppose you have an IoT software system that has a series of
containers that each individually manage a hardware interface, core applica-
tion logic API, an Internet proxy, and a local network proxy. In a security event,
the application could kill all the containers except for the hardware interface
and core application logic, preserving baseline functionality of the system. Sec-
tion 3.4.5 provides an overview of this scenario.
3.4.1 Internal System
To begin, we define n to be positive integers:
Let n ∈ Z+
There is a set called Services comprised of n individually deployable services
s. This implies that each s is treated as a unique element. Even if a service is
‘replicated’, each unit is treated as unique:
Let Services = { s1, . . . , sn }
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Each s ismapped via an arbitrary ‘decision’ function nodeLeveler that decides
an opLevel for each s. opLevel belongs to a set OpLevels, denoted by a set of
positive integers and constrained by the number of s (i.e, n) in the system. In
other words, there is at least one operation level, and there can be at most one
operation level for each service in the system. For clarity, 1 can be thought of
as the essential operation level.
Let nodeLeveler be a ‘decision’ function
nodeLeveler : Services→ OpLevels
∀opLevel ∈ OpLevels, ∃s ∈ Services | opLevel = nodeLeveler( s)
OpLevels ⊆ n
3.4.2 Internal Communication
Each s has an optional number of outward-directional communication meth-
ods to other s, as defined by an application developer. This is represented as
ordered pairs in the relation set Comms, and simplified in the notation as cx:
Comms = {( sa, sb) , ( sa, sc) . . . ) }
Comms = {c1 , c2 . . . ) }
Items in Comms are considered edges in the system, leading to a directed
graph. As such, this leads to each s being a node. As a further constraint, we do
not consider self-referential communication from sa to sa as an edge (loops).This leads to a simple directed graph. Therefore, each s can have a maximum
of exactly one communication path to any other s in Services; as such, for each
s has outdegree of at most n− 1:
0 ≤ | Comms | ≤ n ∗ (n− 1)
To formalize, the System graph is defined as follows, with Services as nodes
and Comms as edges:
System = (Services, Comms)
Comms ⊆ {( sa, sb) | ( sa, sb) ∈ Services2 ∧ sa 6= sb}
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Figure 3.1: A graph representation of an example System. Each node is labeledwith the results of nodeLeveler function, and each edge is ‘weighted’ with theresults of commLeveler.
In order to find the operation level of the communication path, the function
commLeveler is appliedComms. It takes arguments c fromComms, and finds the
maximum of the results of applying the nodeLeveler function to each node in
the ordered pair of c. As a result, each c receives an opLevel, and the maximum
is selected. For example, if a communication endpoint connects from a level 1
node to a level 2 node, that level of communication is set as 2. The reasoning
for this is that once a higher level node is destroyed, the lower level node will
not be able to communicate with it. Because there is no guarantee that each c
will map to all opLevel, the function is not surjective. The functionmaps Comms
to OpLevels as follows:
commLeveler = max(nodeLeveler( sa) , (nodeLeveler( sb) )
commLeveler : Comms→ OpLevels
∀c ∈ Comms, ∃!opLevel ∈ OpLevels | opLevel = commLeveler( c)
commLeveler = {( ( sa, sb) , max(nodeLeveler( sa) , nodeLeveler( sb) ) , . . . }
The results of this allows for each edge to be ‘weighted’, making System a
simple directed weighted graph. While edge weighting is not strictly required,




Asmentioned in 3.3.1, the pattern assumes that all systems require somemethod
of interacting with external systems. As such, there is at least one method of
communicating with an external system. For example, this could be a console
session, a web interface, or an API.
We define m to be positive integers:
Let m ∈ Z+
We define the external systems x, as part of set Ext. There are m external
systems. We treat each external system endpoint as a unique node. As x is
outside the controllable domain of System, it receives an opLevel of 0 by default:
Let Ext = { x1, . . . , xm }
External communication can occur from an internal node to the external
node, and vice versa. This is captured in the relation set ExtComms, and are
treated as edges in the System graph. Each edge operation level is decided by
the commLeveler function. Again, there is no guarantee that each edgewill map
to all opLevel, so the function is not surjective.:
ExtComms = {(xa, sa) , ( sn, xb) . . . ) }
commLeveler : ExtComms→ OpLevels
∀(xa, xb) ∈ ExtComms, ∃!opLevel ∈ OpLevels | opLevel = commLeveler( (xa, xb))
We combine the external nodes and internal nodes, and add the internal
and external edges to create FullSystem.
Nodes = Services ∪ Ext
Edges = Comms ∪ ExtComms
FullSystem = (Nodes, Edges)
3.4.4 Functionality
We treat functionality from each software component and collections of soft-
ware components as ‘black boxes’. That is, functionality of each node on the
graph is only available via some communication path..
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( s1, 1)










Figure 3.2: A graph representation of an example FullSystem, with squarenodes representing Ext, and the dashed line representing ExtComms edges
Functionality is provided over external communication edge x. Each item of
functionality, then, is subject to the opLevel of the edge.
This functionality may be exposed via some intermediary service at a higher
opLevel, meaning that in the case of amode change, while the external function-
ality may be removed at the externally-accessible node, internal functionality
could remain in place. This, however, is a design decision.
3.4.5 Example
While the definitions are necessary, it is helpful to solidify using a simple ex-
ample. In Figure 3.3, there is a microservice-based application on an IoT device
with three levels.
The application consists of four services:
• a hardware interaction service at level 0, that would handle communica-
tions with the underlying hardware such as sensors, actuators, or other
device hardware
• a web API service at level 1, responsible for communicating with the hard-
ware service
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Figure 3.3: An example of services and their communication paths
• an intranet proxy sidecar service at level 1, responsible for communicat-
ing with the web API and any intranet clients
• an internet proxy sidecar service at level 2, responsible for communicat-
ing with the web API and any Internet clients
In terms of communication, as shown, the hardware service directly com-
municates with the hardware user interface to change application state. This
creates a dependency graph, which we explore the implications of in Section
3.6.3. The intranet proxy deals with client endpoints on the internal network,
and the internet proxy deals with client endpoints on the external network.
While the proxy communication pathswould usually be accomplished via an on
device firewall, by utilizing the proxy, connection to functionality can be dynam-
ically updated without affecting the functionality of the internal clients. This is
useful in the case of a secured configuration: should the end user of the IoT
choose to disable all internet functionality, all that is required is stopping the
level 2 service. Should the user no longer require network functionality, they
can disable level 1. This retains hardware functionality.
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Figure 3.4: Statemachine diagram outlining the general process of altering sys-tem state. The solid circle represents the initial state, the circles represent astate, and the double outlined circle represents the start state.
3.5 Mode Change Mechanism
The pattern is essentially an operational level organization system for services,
internal communicationpaths, external communicationpaths, and system func-
tionality. This in itself is useful for structuring the application. By explicitly ab-
stracting or placing key parts of the application further away from interaction
points, there is a natural ‘barrier’ of lower-value application components. While
this is a fairly subjective measure of usefulness, the concrete value comes with
the mode change. As such, there needs to be a way to implement the mode
change.
An example algorithm for the mode change outlined in Figure 3.4 is ex-
tremely basic. The mode change service ‘mode-changer’ listens for a mode
change condition. Once ‘mode-changer’ hears a mode change, it reads the
meta-data of the services, and groups them all by level. It then finds the mini-
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mum,maximum, and current level of the services. If the target level is different
than the current level, ‘mode-changer’ checks if the level is higher or lower. If
the target level is higher – that is, the current level needs to be raised – each
service in the level is started. ‘mode-changer’ then checks if all services have
started. If so, then ‘mode-changer’ updates the current level, and repeats this
process until all services in each group are started up to the target level. If the
target level is lower, each service in the current level is killed, the current level
is updated, and the process repeats. Using the state machine as a basis, we
have added an algorithm using pseudocode in Listing 3.1.
This state machine does not account for the time required to start or stop
the services, or how quickly events should be processed. However, as a rule of
thumb:
• in the case of an opLevel elevation (1 to 2), any subsequent elevation event
should wait an equal or longer length of time than the longest s takes to
start in that level
• in the case of an opLevel reduction (2 to 1), subsequent reduction events
should be processed immediately
The mode change listener can be implemented in a variety of ways. The
most straight-forwardwaywould bewith an external script that calls the engine
or system responsible for maintaining state of the services. The next would
be with a service internal to the system, but with access to APIs that control
the state of services on the target system. The third would be modifying the
engine or statemaintainer of the services to include a kill switch API, which was
implemented in our previous work [41].
3.5.1 Events
Themode change should be triggered by events. For example, a complex event
processor may trigger the mode change. For examples of what may generate
events:
• ‘metadata’ rankings of regular layer 7 (application) requests to the system




min, max, current = find_min_max_current(services_list)
if current_level > target_level:
for i = current_level; i <= target_level; i++:
for service in group[i]:
service.kill()
elif current_level < target_level:
for i = current_level; i >= target_level; i--:







for service in services_list:








for service in services:
if service.level > max_level:
max_level = service.level
if service.level < min_level:
min_level = service.level
if service.level > current_level and service.is_alive:
current_level = service.level
return min_level, max_level, current_level
Listing 3.1: Mode change pseudocode
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• an external cloud system that triggers a mode change, such as an orches-
tration layer
• anon-device or off-device security system thatmonitors for security events
• an internal resourcemonitor that triggers amode change based on some
criteria; for example, a low battery usage, or high resource utilization in a
particular layer
Given that this is a pattern, and not a framework or architecture, how to de-
fine events is not described here. Concrete examples of events are provided in
Chapter 4. Regardless of how events are defined, how they eventually interact
with the system is of importance. An example of mapping events follows.
For any arbitrary event e in set Events, map each e to an opLevel:
eventLeveler : Events→ OpLevels
∀e ∈ Events, ∃!opLevel ∈ OpLevels | opLevel = eventLeveler( e)
3.6 Analysis
The definition of the pattern is aimed at reducing ambiguity, and serves as a
reference point for the pattern. However, there are various ways to implement
a pattern, and kill switch is no different. This section is aimed at analyzing the
pattern, in order to reduce the ambiguity of implementing the pattern and to
understand its benefits and drawbacks.
We discuss level definitions, the trade-offs of communication and depen-
dency, methods of interacting with other design patterns, specific considera-
tions for IoT devices, and limitations and challenges of the pattern.
3.6.1 Level Definition
Levels are the key component of this pattern, as they define how services are
deployed and communicate. However, levels are just the method of organiza-
tion; developers must decide what they represent. It is important to remem-
ber that each of these levels are running concurrently; that is, level 0 is running
when level 1 is running, and levels 0 and 1 are running when level 2 is running.
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Implementation of levels should be accomplished via metadata; that is, the
configuration of levels should not be embedded directly as part of application
code, but as part of the deployment definition of the services. The goal of the
kill switch pattern is not to introduce new functionality to an application based
on levels; the goal is to remove existing functionality of the application in a
controlled way based on end-user requirements. Just like a physical kill switch,
the kill switch pattern is meant to protect end users from unintended conse-
quences of using the system or device. This is an important distinction: end
users are the ones who benefit from graceful service degradation in an emer-
gency event.
Determining how an application will communicate before all services are in
place is challenging. But, separating services into levels reduces the amount
of information flowing to one or all services. Should most or all services be
known, by developing a dependency graph similar to Figure 3.3 and those out-
lined in Chapter 3, service interaction canbemore easily categorized into levels.
Should a service be interconnected to the point where all other services require
communication to one service, this goes against the core of MSA. MSA should
allow for independent deployment of services. In a cloud scenario, tools such
as Chaos Monkey 1 randomly kill instances of services to encourage resiliency.
However, in a resource-constrained system, services do not have the luxury
of using replication to handle resiliency. By limiting communication paths, the
higher level layers compensate or mitigate issues such as problems with end-
client communication. Should communications happen over a message bus,
or a centralized bus, things become easier to implement. However, the bus
itself becomes a critical service, and should be treated as such.
Should a service be essential, it is helpful to create sidecars to limit access
to the service. These sidecars can then be placed at whichever level is required
for dependent services, and be killed to cleanly break communication paths.
Similarly, by using multiple lightweight API gateways, different levels of the ap-
plication can be exposed based on levels. As a drawback, this introduces over-
head.
Consider that not all parts of the application are required to be in a level;
however, any service outside of scope will either be always running, be killed
1https://netflix.github.io/chaosmonkey/
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should the kill policy of the application deem it necessary, or be running inter-
mittently despite any scenario requiring essential services only.
3.6.2 Internet-of-Things Devices
While we have described the kill switch in terms of multiple levels, it is aimed
at an MSA architecture with few interdependencies and a mission-critical set
of functionality. In an oversimplification, IoT devices have two duties: perform
some real-life function, such as sensing input from the real world or operating
as a normal item in everyday life, and provide functionality over a network in-
terface. In its most basic form, the kill switch should be implemented in two
levels to reflect this. The level 0 would be the core hardware interaction level,
and level 1 would be for all other ‘smart’ functionality. From an end-users’ per-
spective, if the device is under active attack, it should still have functionality
without being connected to the cloud.
In short, this pattern is aimed at single-node, multi-container environments
as defined in Section 2.2.1. This does not preclude it from MSA. MSA gains a
significant amount of influence because deployed services are designed to be
more transient. That is, MSA services should be designed to be killed, restarted,
and scaled. Because IoT devices do not have access to a large amount of re-
sources, the kill switch pattern acts as a mitigation for redundancy, while still
realizing many of the benefits of MSA. By controlling application functionality
by level state, the application is more predictable should higher level services
become unusable.
3.6.3 Communication and Dependency
While not a hard requirement of the pattern, it is suggested that the graph de-
rived from the resultant architecture shouldminimize the amount of cycles, es-
pecially between opLevel groupings. In other words, the resultant graph should
aim to be a directed acyclic graph. With fewer cycles, there are clearly defined
paths for data to flow amongst the nodes. This eases in realization of the pat-
tern in real-world terms. We use this approach in Chapter 4.
As part of our definition of the kill switch pattern, we stipulate that func-
tionality can only be exposed via communication paths. This also means we
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have stipulated that communication paths are synonymous with dependency.
That is, functionality of base services can only be exposed via a communication
path, which creates dependency. As such, higher level services should have a
dependency on lower level services, but not vice versa. This creates challenges
when developing microservice architectures as services may not be structured
in a tiered way.
In many cases, MSA architectures are ‘flat’; services all operate amongst
themselves, and with no clear chain of communication. For example, take an
architecture with all ‘level 0’ functionality. In this scenario, if we were to try to
have all services communicate, the resulting dependency graph would be un-
predictable. This creates a scenario where the kill switch pattern would not be
able to be implemented. Of interest, this is also difficult to manage from an
MSA perspective. If the services all become so coupled that they cannot op-
erate without other ‘equal level’ services, starting the services in the case of a
system failure may not be possible.
One particular scenario of concern is a cyclical dependency. If all services
create a cycle with independent nodes, those services essentially have to be
treated as one ‘supernode’. This could be fine if there are other services in the
system, but if these are the only services in a given system, there should be
a clear ‘point of contact’, and only allow the coupled services to communicate
amongst themselves.
There are ways to mitigate this. For example, higher level services are able
to access the lower level service via sidecar proxies placed at a level higher than
the lower level service. This also helps to decouple the two services. Further-
more, multiple sidecars exposing different sets of functionality of the same ser-
vice can be developed, exposing the underlying service in a tiered way. Should
we expose some of those services to one another via sidecars at higher levels,
this creates a situation akin to facades in object oriented programming.
Esparrachi, Reilly, and Rentz [42] outline concerns when mapping out mi-
croservice dependencies. They outline that these dependencies become a di-
rected graph, and that graphswith no cycles are ideal. They also describemeth-
ods of dependency management via passively tracking or actively controlling
them. The authors also suggest building services such that they are ‘stacked’,
meaning that services never depend on services below them. This is what we
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suggest when developing MSA applications, especially for single-device imple-
mentations.
There are tools available that ease tracking dependencies in MSA. In [43],
Ma et al. describe such a tool called GSMART: graph-based and scenario-driven
microservice analysis, retrieval, and testing. This type of tool can be used for
existing and design of MSA applications.
By developing the services with their dependency in mind, and by mapping
out their communication paths, we are then able to understand the application
as a whole. This also allows an understanding of its critical functionality. As this
is a pattern, we do not define or mandate any particular method of doing this.
3.6.4 Related Patterns
As with many other patterns, this pattern is compatible and more useful when
combinedwith other patterns. This section outlines key patterns that kill switch
is comparable to, or can interact with.
Cloud Design Patterns
In many respects, the kill switch pattern is a variation of the layered or tiered
pattern. However, we are applying layers to disparate services, as opposed to
a monolithic applications or deployments. In addition, the levels are arbitrary
groupings based on internal and external functionality, where layers or tiers
are defined by logical groupings. The layer or tiered approach does not have
any opinion of functionality implementation, whereas kill switch is opinionated.
The bulkhead pattern, as described in Section 2.3.1, is similar to the kill
switch pattern. However, it is helpful to think of bulkhead as a vertical segmen-
tation of services, whereas kill switch segments it out horizontally. Additionally,
the bulkhead pattern is aimed at leveraging cloud functionality such as auto-
scaling or redundancy. Kill switch is also opinionated about the grouping of
services. One particular configuration of interest is ‘kill-switch-in-a-bulkhead’.
A series of services, segmented ‘horizontally’ into bulkheads, can then also im-
plement the kill switch leveling ‘vertically’. This allows for individual bulkheads
to have mode changes applied to them. Also, it allows for the entire set of ser-
vices to be controlled in a similar way to orchestration. However, in contrast to
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Figure 3.5: A generic kill switch architecture implementing cloud patterns
arbitrary orchestration, defined ‘levels’ and ‘bulkheads’ could be started at will.
As an example, consider Figure 3.5. While there are various ways to im-
plement the bulkhead pattern, in this case we assume the services are inde-
pendently collaborating in ‘swim lanes’. That is, each microservice is vertically
segmented, with dependencies on higher and lower components. Requests
are made asynchronously to each service, and the services are not dependent
on one another. In this case, the components of each microservice are able
to have identical levels. Alternatively, the services can be individually leveled;
level 0, 1, and 2 in Service A can be started differently that service B.
Using sidecar and ambassador patterns with the kill switch lead to some in-
teresting scenarios. As mentioned, when using these patterns, an application
can expose functionality at different levels without having to expose the base
service. To use an object-oriented term, sidecars can be used as a combina-
tion of facades and feature toggles. In other words, the sidecar can be built
such that it only exposes part of the functionality of the underlying service to
higher-level service. Again, referring to Figure 3.5, assume that the sidecars are
only used to expose functionality, and do not provide further augmentation to
the service functionality. In this case, the application can expose and shut off
access at level 2, if required, by leveraging sidecars.
The circuit-breaker pattern should be used in conjunctionwith the kill switch
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pattern. As parts of an application architecture are designed to be killed, there
should be some way for lower opLevel services to prevent further requests to
upstream services. This also helps to prevent resource starvation situations, as
gracefully backing off connection requests also inherently creates a method of
dealing with unavailable resources. Considering Figure 3.5, should the sidecars
in level 2 be killed, subsequent requests from internal or external communica-
tion endpoints should detect the failed request and back off further attempts.
Safety-Critical Patterns
Our pattern is not labeled as ‘safety-critical’, and should not be used for such
until further research is conducted into the safety implications as outlined by
this domain. For example, the pattern does not account for concerns such as
anomalies, or replication. Our approach developed this pattern from a ‘cloud’
and Internet-of-Things perspective. However, the approach led to some simi-
larities between our pattern and those in the safety-critical domain. Of inter-
est are failure types. Our pattern allows a controlled method of dealing with
failures, and for implementation of different failure types. This is similar to im-
plementing a ‘fail-safe’ mode. However, our pattern does not stipulate what
type of functionality is exposed at any given time, so strict claims about the
guarantees or types of failure mitigation cannot be made.
By having a ‘known good’ state of critical functionality to fall back to, the ar-
chitecture itself is able to revert to that state. While the ‘safe state’ is essentially
described as the safest state possible with fewest negative side effects, the safe
state pattern takes many forms. For example, if the design safe state of a car
is to lock up, and it locks up while driving, this could cause further harm. This
is an example of an objectively bad safe state, as too much functionality is re-
moved. In this case, the car should allow manual steering and manual brakes
to be used, independent of the ECU. Similarly, the kill switch allows for imple-
mentation of these types of states – states that an application can fall back to.
However, kill switch concepts are compatible with basic premise of ‘safe
states’. Our approach can meet the stipulations of safe state defined by [40]
discussed in 2.5 based on the rigour of realization of the pattern, but this is
up to the system developer. Our approach takes a ‘lighter’ vision of this, by
allowing a state similar to a ‘safe state’ to be defined in the case of a perfectly
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functioning system. In other words, the ‘safe states’ available by realization of
the pattern are arbitrary, they do not consider underlying hardware, and do
not impose any stipulations.
3.6.5 Security and Maintainability
By utilizing this pattern, we assert that the resultant application is more secure
and maintainable. The adoption of containers and microservices themselves
offer significant security and maintainability advantages if implemented cor-
rectly. For example, each service and set of services are able to be deployed
individually, without having to update the entire application. This allows for
devices to receive ‘piece wise’ updates. This allows for individual components
to be updated, independent of other parts of the system.
However, implementing the pattern also allows for a higher level of security
and maintainability. Microservices can lead to spiraling dependency issues. By
utilizing the pattern, the resultant architecture enforces a clear understanding
of dependencies between components. This is a huge advantage when devel-
oping new code for applications of any type; by ensuring that the dependency
chain is built directly into the architecture of the system, an understanding of
the system is clearer, and changes can be made more easily.
In addition, by incorporating a ‘known-good’ state into the design of the sys-
tem, there is always a fallback should higher level services become affected or
unusable. The definition of level 0 as a set of critical functionality establishes a
baseline in the event of either unknown circumstances, or a security event.
3.6.6 Limitations and Challenges
Every pattern has limitations and challenges. While we have discussed some
of them in the above sections, we will expand on them here from this context.
We will also discuss some that are out-of-scope for the above sections.
As mentioned in Section 3.6.1, the kill switch pattern is best suited for appli-
cations with discrete critical and non-critical functionality. Specifically, these levels
should be critical functionality and non-critical functionality. While the possibil-
ity of introducing multiple levels allows for fine-grained control over reducing
system functionality, the design of such a system is quite challenging. In other
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words, use of the pattern can lead to spiraling complexity. Trying to account for
each level is challenging, and mapping the dependencies of microservices is
difficult as it is. As such, it forces the application to adopt a tiered approach.
While this in itself is not an issue, some applications are not designed to be
built in such a way. This is why we stipulate that this pattern is best-suited for
limited scope MSA applications, such as those on IoT devices.
As mentioned in Section 3.6.3, the kill switch pattern is best suited for ar-
chitectures with few to no graph cycles. If cycles are in the system, it creates a
scenario where the services in the cycle should be placed in the same level due
to dependencies.
Amajor limitation is that the pattern is most effective when paired with a mode
change mechanism. This strays into the area of frameworks. A framework is
a cohesive set of components that accomplish a goal, whereas a pattern is a
methodology or general structure to solve an architecture problem. Kill switch
is decidedly a pattern, and defines methods of building microservice applica-
tions with enforced consideration of dependency.
A concern specific to the mode change functionality is the length of time it
takes to start a number of levels. If a system is in a state where it is raising its
level, the system must wait for the services in a group to start. This may take
a significant amount of time. This creates situations where emergency mode
changes are received. How the mode change deals with this scenario is out-
side the scope of this work, but safety-critical systems have several methods of
recovering from such a scenario [40].
Another limitation is the case ofmultiple dependent services with equal impor-
tance. For example, take a critical service that has two dependent services. The
services perform very different functionality, but are of equal importance. The
kill switch pattern does not have an elegant way of dealing with this scenario;
either one service is placed in a higher level than another, or they are placed
in the same level. If a scenario causes a mode change that should only affect
one of the dependent services, there is no way to decide which to kill. In this
case, using the bulkhead pattern to segment out the kill switch ‘planes’ would




We chose to demonstrate efficacy via example realizations of the pattern. In
Section 4.2, we demonstrate a naive realization of the pattern, and implemen-
tation of the mode change by modifying the Docker engine API. In Section
4.3, we built an example realization demonstrating the kill switch pattern and
demonstrate the usefulness of the resultant architecture using a ‘manual’ kill
switch tool. In Section 4.4, we demonstrate how this kill switch can be used in
conjunction with an intrusion detection system to utilize the resultant architec-
ture.
Select source code is available in Appendix B, C, D for posterity, and on
Github1 for easier access. All source code is available upon request.
4.1 Set-Up
In order to demonstrate the kill switch pattern, we have opted to develop the
realization examples using commodity hardware. The system used as the tar-
get of deployment in each of these realizations is not an IoT system. It is a
standard bare-metal system using Ubuntu Desktop as the base operating sys-
tem, and is running Docker. Further specifications of the system are shown in
Appendix A.2. This was done for the following reasons:
• the concepts are easily transferable to regularmicroservice deployments,
• the nature of virtualization allows this example to be deployed to open
IoT systems that support containers,
• to ease the development process.
1https://github.com/davidlennick/killswitch-examples
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4.2 Docker Engine API Modification Example
This was an early effort that lead to the kill switch pattern in its current form,
which was published in [41]. Our intent was to explore if implementation of
this type of system was feasible. We took a naive approach to levelling, as
well as the functionality of services. We deployed a set of ‘essential’ and ‘non-
essential’ containers, and specified themwith a label. On someevent, themode
change collected and checked all container labels, and killed any unnecessary
containers. We chose this implementation because it is a simple, relatively un-
opinionated way to demonstrate the concept of the pattern. It was simple to
implement, and as a result, simple to understand. It was aimed at demonstrat-
ing the efficacy of implementing the pattern without assuming any application
type. This also allowed for a demonstration of the trade-offs between imple-
mentation of the mode change mechanism using various strategies.
We modified the engine by adding the “kill switch” API endpoint, and added
the logic to actually perform the mode change (ie., kill all non-essential con-
tainers). The API listened on a Unix socket, and accepted a POST HTTP request
with no payload. We implemented the associated logic for the API leveraging
existing engine backend interfaces. The logic flow is: a timer is initialized, the
container IDs matching the specified label are found, the kill method for each
container is invoked, the timer stops, and the execution time is returned. All
containers are assumed to be critical unless otherwise specified in order to
make development more straightforward. Figure 4.1 outlines the generalized
sequence of eventswe implemented, and how themode change operates. This
process is similar to the mode change algorithm outlined in Section 3.5.
To provide an overview, Figure 4.2b outlines a simplified diagram of the
Docker engine and associated logical layers. There are four ‘top’ logical layers:
• amanagement layer, which denotesmethods of interactingwith theDocker
engine externally;
• an application layer, which holds application containers;
• the Docker engine layer;
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Figure 4.1: Sequence diagram for mode change implementation in Docker
• and theoperating system layer, which iswhatever operating systemDocker
can run on (meaning Linux).
The Docker engine itself is separated into three logical layers [44]: the en-
gine API layer; the component libraries; and base libraries. Component li-
braries combine the lower level libraries to perform tasks such as life cycle
management of containers, image creation, modification of networking tables
on the host operating system to network containers, or other typical function-
ality of the engine. The dashed boxes show the logical components that we
modified. The diagram shows that only the engine API layer was modified for
this implementation. The modified components are further outlined in Figure
4.2a. Modifications to lower levels of the engine, such as the task queue, or
the backend modules the APIs leverage, were not explored. The important ex-
ecuted code is outlined in Listing 4.1.
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(a) Simplified overview of engine API modifications
(b) Simplified Docker engine block diagram
Figure 4.2: Summary of Docker engine modifications
To verify efficacy, and to further demonstrate implementation of the mode
change, we wrote an external Go script leveraging the Docker client Go library
to performing the same functionality as the API. This external script is meant
to demonstrate an external system, such as an orchestration layer. The code
is virtually identical to mode change API code. However, one key difference is
that should this script be invoked from a remote machine, the time to react to
the event and perform the mode change would be dramatically increased due
to network latency.
We used a Bash script as the ‘event dispatcher’, which calls the internal
mode change API using cURL and starts theGo script for the external kill switch.




var start = time.Now()
var d time.Duration
// actual start
var sig uint64 = 0x9 // kill signal
var filter = filters.NewArgs()
filter.Add("label", "safety=false")
// return filtered containers




if err != nil {
return err
}
// kill all the containers that match










Listing 4.1: Docker engine modifications
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c_num -> maximum number of containers to test in system
iterations -> number of times to repeat the test




add a "safety" container
for i in range(iterations):
PRINT the time
PRINT c
add c "non-safety" containers
call the kill switch API
PRINT kill switch execution time
add c "non-safety" containers
call the local Go script
PRINT script execution time
Listing 4.2: Testing algorithm
• Given a number of containers (c), clean the environment of all existing
containers, and add a safety-critical container
• For both the kill switch API and external script:
– add a number of non-safety-critical containers
– get the current time
– call the kill switch and wait for process to complete
– calculate and print the execution time
Listing 4.2 further describes the testing process.
Using 20 for the number of containers, including the zero-case where no
containers are instantiated, and 5 for the number of iterations, we repeated
the above process 4 times. This led to twenty iterations for each number of
containers. We performed each iteration at various points over the course of
a few days to mitigate the variability in test operating environment. Although
the container images were not of significance in this implementation, it might
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be of interest they all used the Ubuntu image. The test operating environment
was a laptop with an Intel i7-8550U, 8GB of DDR4 RAM at 2133MHz, running
Ubuntu Desktop 18.04.
Using the test results, we calculated the average execution and standard de-
viation of execution time for both the kill switch API and Go script. Using these
averaged results, we then calculated the time deltas between the kill switch and
Go script execution times (kill switch execution time − Go script execution time).
Data sets are available on request. Overall, in 13/21 runs (61%), the kill switch
was faster. However, all results were within the margin of error, so this result
is essentially meaningless – variability can be attributed to a variety of factors
such as operating environment. On average, it took approximately 0.32s to
shut down each container.
4.2.1 Discussion
The main takeaways were that the API implementing the mode change was
straightforward to write, it had little to no negative impact on performance
because it leveraged existing backend systems, that non-essential containers
were indeed killed, and that the containers were killed in a comparable amount
of time to an external script using the same APIs.
A criticism of this approach is that this architecture pattern consideration
should be addressed by an external container orchestration layer, as opposed
to the engine layer. To respond, orchestration implementations vary signifi-
cantly, and the pattern of implementationmay not be consistent. Furthermore,
orchestration layers may be unreachable or non-functional in the events sur-
rounding the requirement to switch to a safety-critical mode. Including these
considerations at the engine level allow for fewer external dependencies – the
engines are integral, whereas orchestration is not.
This approach demonstrates a different method of implementing themode
change pattern – in the virtualization engine itself.
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4.3 Basic Example
In this scenario, we built a simple model-view-controller (MVC) style web appli-
cation using the microservice architecture pattern, and the kill switch pattern.
A database hosts a data repository for a model, the controller allows access
of the model’s properties and storage, and the view presents the information
received about the model from the controller. This application consists of four
parts, as outlined in Figure 4.3a.
(a) A high-level overview of each container, with a corresponding level.
( db, 0) ( api, 1) (ui, 2) ( prox, 3)
intranet client internet client
1 2 3
2 3
(b) A graph representation of the resultant application architecture from thefirst example.
Figure 4.3: Diagrams of the basic example
The application itself is is essentially a mock-up, loosely based on a "to do"
app. There are a set of tasks, that are either complete or incomplete. All in-
teractions happen programatically with no actual user input available via the
user interface. The database uses PostgreSQL and hosts a single table and
database. The node.js server connects to the database, makes queries against
it, and serves results via an Express representational state transfer (REST) API.
On instantiation, the user interface server generates an HTML page. The page
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is generated using a simple template, that is populated with results of GET re-
quests to the API server. This is intended to simulate, or imitate, server-side
rendering as seen in UI frameworks and libraries like React or Angular. The
Nginx server then serves the ‘server-side rendered’ static HTML file via port
8090. The reverse proxy, as the name suggests, proxies connections at port
80 on behalf of the user interface container’s port 8090. In this scenario, port
8090 is be used as an ‘intranet’ access port, and port 80 is used as an Internet
access port.
As mentioned, each component of the application follows the microservice
architecture pattern [6]. Each element of the application is separated into its
own ‘microservice’. As an alternative, if the application were to be built using
‘traditional’monolithic architecture, the API anduser interfacewould bewritten
and hosted on the same server at the very least, and at the very worst, tightly
coupled. An example may be a PHP server that has in-line database queries on
rendered web pages.
To help explain how this is an example ofmicroservices, the UI service could
easily be redeveloped internally alongside the existing UI, without affecting ser-
vice. The UI service could then be deployed internally, without adversely af-
fecting the existing UI service. Similarly, a replacement API could be developed
along side the existing one, etc.
Of importance is that the application is structured to follow the kill switch
pattern. Each microservice of application has been labelled based on their de-
pendency and functionality. For example, without the database, the applica-
tion would not function. Similarly, without the API, the application would not
function. However, the exposed functionality of the database allows some level
of functionality of the app. As such, the database is deemed ‘level 0’, or the es-
sential service, and the API as ‘level 1’. The user interface is classed as ‘level
3’ as it provides a view of the application functionality. The API provides the
functionality of interacting with the model, and the UI renders that informa-
tion in order to view it in a browser. The levels, services, and communication
paths are shown in Figure 4.3b, which serves as a formalization of the graph in
Figure 4.3a.
The docker-compose.yaml file, defines the levels as part of the build defini-
tion. An excerpt of this is shown in Listing 4.3, which also further describes how
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each microservice is deployed. Of interest are the exposed ports, the environ-
ment variables used by each microservice, and the names of each.
Weaveworks Scope2 is software used to visualize container deployments in
a variety of infrastructure configurations, including Kubernetes deployments.
In this case, we used Scope on a single host to view the deployed containers
as shown in Figure 4.4a. The hexagons represent a container running on the
device, and are labelled with the container’s name. The horizontal lines under-
neath the hexagons represent a network that each container belongs to. The
lines connecting the hexagons represent network communication. The clouds
represent separate communication endpoints, and the stack of squares rep-
resent a device. We deployed the containers using ‘docker-compose’, which











































Listing 4.3: docker-compose.yaml excerpt
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(a) In this figure, the basic architecture of the service is shownas actually deployed by using Weaveworks Scope.
(b) Validation of the mode change functionality
Figure 4.4: Architecture visualization of before and after the mode change
We verified the application was returning the expected results from the ‘ex-
ternal’ port 80, and the ‘internal’ port 8090 in Listing 4.4. Each cURL request re-
turned a 200, meaning that both the ports were actively allowing connections
and serving content.
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{’level’: 2, ’verbose’: False}
INFO:root:Min/max/active level: 0/3/3
INFO:root:Level 3 containers state change:
INFO:root:container: /lvl3_proxy state: killed
INFO:root:Level 2 containers state change:
INFO:root:container: /lvl2_ui state: none
INFO:root:Level 1 containers state change:
INFO:root:container: /lvl1_api state: none
INFO:root:Level 0 containers state change:
INFO:root:container: /lvl0_db state: none
$ curl -I http://127.0.0.1:8090 && curl -I http://127.0.0.1:80
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
[...]
curl: (7) Failed to connect to 127.0.0.1 port 80: Connection refused
Listing 4.4: Killswitch script result for basic example
The script performs the functionality described in Section 3.5, with relevant
code outlined in Listing 4.5. To summarize, the script groups the containers,
finds the minimum, maximum, and current level the application is running at,
and starts killing all containers until it reaches the target level. The script ran on
the same host as the Docker engine, which allowed the Docker Python SDK to
connect directly to the Unix socket HTTP API. This caused the proxy container
We called the kill switch script to set the application to a lower level; from
level 3 to level 2. Themode change found a container at level 3, and killed it. We
verified that the container thatwas killedwas the proxy using cURL, and verified
that the UI service was still available on port 8090. We then repeated the call
using level 1 as the target state, as shown in Listing 4.4. The image shows the
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container in layers 2 was killed. We verified that the UI was not available. We
again repeated the call with -1, and all containers in the system were killed.
def do_killswitch(c: Container, target_level: int):
if ’level’ in c.attrs[’Labels’]:
if int(c.attrs[’Labels’][’level’]) <= target_level:
if c.attrs[’State’] != ’running’:
c.start()
else:
if c.attrs[’State’] == ’running’:
c.kill()
return c
def wait_until_all_running(client: docker.DockerClient, c_list):
[...]
def killswitch(client: docker.DockerClient, target_level: int):




if target_level >= active_level:
for level in sorted(grouped_c_lists.keys()):
res = [do_killswitch(c, target_level)
for c in grouped_c_lists[level]]
if level <= target_level:
wait_until_all_running(client, grouped_c_lists[level])
else:
for level in sorted(grouped_c_lists.keys(), reverse=True):
res = [do_killswitch(c, target_level)
for c in grouped_c_lists[level]]
Listing 4.5: killswitch.py script excerpt
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4.3.1 Discussion
Of note, this architecture is similar to the implementation described by Mora-
bito et al. [33], such that it contains a hierarchy of functionality.
By dynamically destroying containers, we were able to remove the user in-
terface from the application. This still allowed the API server and database to
run. However, because the API server and database server were not exposed
to the host network, they were not accessible. In this case, the system contin-
ued to run, but lost all ‘external’ functionality.
We were able start levels via the mode change as well. Because the health
check functionality was defined in the docker-compose file, we were able to
wait until all containers in a specific level were healthy before starting the next
level.
While this is a simple example, it demonstrates a few things. First, if the ap-
plication were to be under attack, the administrator would just have to call the
script to prevent further calls from reaching the UI service. Because the appli-
cation was built using MSA, we were also able to decide which services would
be placed at specific levels. If the application had been built with the database,
API server, and user interface all on one container, this level of control would
not be possible.
The implementation of the script also allows for remote connectivity as well.
If the Docker engine exposed its management interface over a TCP socket, as
opposed to a Unix socket, the script would be able to remotely control the
containers on the system. In some respects, this is a method of container or-
chestration. In other words, we use the pattern to define how the containers
are to be orchestrated.
4.4 Intrusion Detection System Example
In this realization, we continue with the basic example ‘MVC-via-MSA’ appli-
cation. However, we introduce a more realistic method of triggering the kill
switch: an intrusion detection system (IDS).
An intrusion detection system listens to packets crossing a network. Usually,
the IDS targets a network interface to monitor. The IDS then categorizes the
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traffic it observes based on signatures. If the signature matches a policy in a
set of defined rules, the IDS can then perform different actions such as creating
alerts or blocking the traffic. In our case, we are using the IDS to monitor the
traffic of our host interface. However, this could be configured to only monitor
a specific container network, or even a specific container.
We also implemented monitoring and logging infrastructure for the IDS.
Namely, we configured a Suricata3, Elasticsearch4, Logstash5, andKibana6 (SELK)
stack. Logstash is used to ingest data frommultiple sources, format it, and then
send it to a storage solution. Elasticsearch is an analytics engine used to store,
search, analyze, and transform structured and unstructured data. Kibana is a
visualization engine for Elasticsearch, which allows a user to create dashboards
and visualizations of data. In addition, we configured and deployed Evebox, a
purpose-built user interface for viewing events and alerts from Suricata.
Suricata writes alerts and events to a file called eve.json. Logstash ingests
the logs from eve.json, formats them, and sends them to Elasticsearch. Kibana
then creates dashboards of IDS statistics, alerts, and other useful visualizations
based on the logging information in Elasticsearch. This was implemented in
order to help during the development of the kill switch service, and in order
to create a more ‘thorough’ example implementation. This will be explored in
Section 4.4.1.
We also introduce a ‘kill switch’ service, hosted in a container. We used the
same script from Section 4.3 to perform themode change operations. We then
developed amonitoring script that used the existing Pythonmodule to perform
the actions based on events generated by Suricata. Themonitoring script reads
the logs that Suricata writes to. If an alert matches a rule defined in the kill
switch service, the kill switch service performs a mode change.
We configured Suricata to listen on the host’s network interface, and wrote
a custom rule to monitor for TCP packets coming from an external network
with the content ‘KILLSWITCH’. This was intended to represent an ambiguous,




Figure 4.5: A high-level overview of each container in the IDS and example sys-tem.
Figure 4.6: A deployment diagram of monitoring infrastructure and the exam-ple application. Each set of microservices combine to make a ‘service’. In thiscase, we have the ‘base-example’ service and the ‘ids-example’ service.
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Figure 4.7: A Weaveworks Scope visualization of the IDS example.
A high-level diagram and deployment diagram are shown in Figures 4.5 and
4.6. While our infrastructure and application are all running on the same ma-
chine, this scenario was designed to simulate a more realistic approach to IoT
MSA applications. In this case, the MVC application would be running on an IoT
device. The IDS services would be running on an edge device, and would in-
spect network traffic of the downstream IoT device for events causing a mode
change. In this scenario, the monitoring infrastructure is outside the control
of the kill switch pattern realization; that is, the infrastructure is not placed in
levels. It will not be affected by invocation of the mode change. This topic is
explored in Section 4.4.1.
We began by starting the containers with docker-compose, which is shown
in the Scope visualization in Figure 4.7. This started IDSmonitoring and logging
services, the kill switch service, as well as the application microservices.
We verified Suricata was monitoring for traffic, and verified that all contain-
ers started successfully. We then sent a cURL command from an external sys-
tem to the host port 80 with the content ‘KILLSWITCH_2’. This caused Suricata
to detect the request as seen in Listing 4.6, which triggered an alert. The alert
was written to eve.json. The alert was read by the kill switch service, which
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performed the mode change to level 2. This disabled the proxy server for the
application, which in turn closed port 80. We retried sending the cURL to the
host from the external machine, and it was unsuccessful.
The only way to re-enable the services after the mode change was via man-





INFO:root:waiting for eve.json file...
INFO:root:eve.json file found, continuing...




















"payload_printable":"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 192.168.9.28\r\nUser-




INFO:root:Level 3 containers state change:
INFO:root:container: /lvl3_proxy state: killed
INFO:root:Level 2 containers state change:
INFO:root:container: /lvl2_ui state: none
INFO:root:Level 1 containers state change:
INFO:root:container: /lvl1_api state: none
INFO:root:Level 0 containers state change:
INFO:root:container: /lvl0_db state: none
Listing 4.6: The kill switch service has read the alert from the log and initiatesthe mode change
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4.4.1 Discussion
This architecture is similar to those outlined in Section 2.4.1, such that there
is a clear separation between the ‘IoT’ device domain, and a ‘cloud’ or ‘edge’
system system domain.
Strictly speaking, only the kill switch service, and Suricata services are re-
quired from the ids-example. However, this allows us to explore the possibil-
ities of this configuration. In the actual event of a scenario causing a mode
change, there are a few different possibilities of how to handle the containers
that are actually killed.
The most obvious configuration is the one we have outlined - only the ap-
plication services on the IoT device would be killed. This is what we discussed
in the above section.
A different scenario is that all services have implemented the kill switch pat-
tern. In this case, the base example would remain unchanged. The design de-
cision comes with the IDS system.
In this case, there is a clear hierarchy of dependency. The killswitch service is
essential. It can functionwith or without Suricata viamanual invocation. In fact,
it may be unwise to place it under a level. If the kill switch service is destroyed,
mode change functionality is lost.
The next step of dependency, in terms of intended functionality, is the Suri-
cata service. It has its own local storage, so it has no other dependencies. Next,
the ELK stack has its own set of dependencies. Elasticsearch is a datastore,
and Logstash writes data to it. The difficulties arise because Elasticsearch is
the datastore, but it cannot receive information without Logstash. In addition,
Elasticsearch has two upstream dependencies: Evebox and Kibana.
The design trade-offs between placing Elasticsearch and Logstash at differ-
ent levels in this case are minimal. Because they are tightly coupled, it makes
sense to place them at the same level. So, that leaves us with the following
order of dependency:
• the kill switch service, which we will not define a level for
• Suricata, defined as level 0
• Elasticsearch and Logstash, defined as level 1
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• and Kibana and Evebox, defined as level 2
However, we have two distinct ‘areas of deployment’: the IoT device and the
edge device. The design decision becomes whether to apply the mode change
to all services across both areas of deployment, or if they should remain sep-
arate. This is up to preference; by treating them all as one system, a higher
level of ‘security’ is achieved. By treating them as different, more granular con-
trol is achieved. Both are acceptable, and both can co-exist. This would be an
example of using the bulkhead and kill switch patterns in conjunction.
However, one more point of interest is a little less obvious: the dependen-
cies across the two systems, or between the two systems in general. Objectively
speaking, the application is dependent on the security provided by the IDS. An-
other design decision is if the kill switch pattern should be applied to the two
resulting services.
4.5 Discussion
Via these examples, we have gained several insights.
The pattern is feasible, and addresses a design problem. The pattern is an ef-
fective tool for structuring applications, and guiding MSA application design. It ad-
dresses the problem of dependency in MSA architectures by enforcing a clear
hierarchy and levels. However, this does not mean that an application is re-
quired to follow a top-down approach to development and dependency.
There are a variety of ‘locations’ to implement the mode change mechanism: a
script, a service, or a modification to the virtualization method.
An external script is simple, and effective. It can be used either on device, or
remotely. It is flexible, allows for easy customization, and is an effectivemethod
for an operator or system administrator to invoke a mode change. However, it
is difficult to integrate with service deployments, or with automation tools. The
script requires direct access to the underlying operating system, whichmay not
exist in the case of a locked-down system.
A service is slightly more difficult to implement than a script, but is more
portable. All dependencies are packaged into the service, which allows for the
operation mechanism to operate the same way, every time. It allows for auto-
mated deployment with the rest of an MSA application. However, the service
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is required to be deployed either with the service or as a system service. Fur-
thermore, it requires privileged access to the virtualization method in order to
directly control the state of microservices. This would be the primary method
of integrating the mode change with a service orchestrator.
Modification of the virtualization method is outside the scope of a typical
microservice application, and is not practical. An example is the modification
of the Docker engine. However, it allows for controlled, repeatable, and effi-
cient implementation of the mode change. It also provides a centralized point
to perform the mode change, without having to expose the engine to low-level
access. It allows for easier integrationwith service orchestration. However, cre-
ating a ‘modified’ virtualization engine strays from the upstream development
branch, and requires maintenance to remain up-to-date. It is also subject to
any changes that may occur at this level.
Realization of the pattern can be very simple, or very complex. As discussed
in Section 4.4.1, there are a variety of considerations that have to be made
when implementing the kill switch pattern. The ‘basic’ example was objec-
tively straight-forward. The IDS example introduced significant complexity, es-
pecially as it simulated a multi-device scenario. This alludes to the spiraling
complexity discussed as a challenge in Section 3.6.6.
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5. Conclusions
This thesis began by asking how to address Internet of Things device security,
maintainability, and planned-obsolescence by using microservice architecture.
In doing so, we found new and growing areas of research in MSA-based IoT
application architectures and MSA dependency. We investigated the state-of-
the-art in terms of virtualization, containers and their patterns, cloud design
patterns, IoT architectures and MSA architectures, and IoT container perfor-
mance. We found that while general cloud patterns exist for MSA, there are
none that directly address MSA-based IoT devices and systems. We found ev-
idence of architectures that had implemented elements of what we refer to
as the kill switch pattern. We identified, conceptualized, defined, and proposed
the kill switch pattern, a pattern to organize and reduce of functionality of MSA
applications in a controlled way. The pattern addresses design problems re-
volving aroundmicroservice dependency, and a ‘soft’ multi-level version of safe
state design. We proposed a basicmode change algorithm to further utilize the
kill switch pattern. We analyzed the pattern in the context of level definition,
Internet-of-Things devices, communication and dependency, related patterns,
and it’s limitations and challenges. We created several scenarios, ranging from
a simple MSA application architecture realizing the pattern, to an IDS imple-
mentation that invoked a mode change, to modification of the Docker engine
to evaluate feasibility of the approach.
However, as described in Section 3.6.6, there are trade-offs and limitations
when using this pattern. The kill switch pattern is best suited for applications
with discrete critical and non-critical functionality. Use of the pattern can lead
to spiraling complexity. The pattern is best suited for limited scope MSA ap-
plication, such as those on IoT devices. The pattern is best suited for archi-
tectures with hierarchical dependencies, with few or no cyclical dependencies.
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The pattern is best utilized with a mode changemechanism. Themode change
is subject to the length of time to start each level.
In addition, there are limitations of our approach of demonstrating efficacy
via example realizations. To begin, our implementation by example does not
include metric collection of any sort. Analysis of the pattern implementation
is based via examples, and is hard to quantify. This requires further investi-
gation. Another limitation is that the example realizations are aimed only at
single-device implementations. It would have been interesting to demonstrate
the spiraling complexity of implementing the kill switch on a multi-device sys-
tem, or an all-encompassing IoT system architecture. Furthermore, we only
briefly discuss implementation on a ‘full’ IoT system in Section 4.4.1. This sug-
gests that as more examples are developed, further nuances and studies can
be conducted on efficacy and feasiblity of the kill switch pattern and associated
mode change mechanism. An additional point of concern are the actual imple-
mentations. Developers implement things in a variety of ways, but can lead to
the same result. Architectures are no different. It is prudent to assume that
the kill switch pattern would not be effective for all implementation styles, and
again, requires further investigation.
As is hopefully evident from the discussion in Section 4.4.1, the proposed
pattern is versatile. While the concept itself is fairly straight-forward, it has
the ability to be quite powerful if realized in a meaningful way. As such, we
assert that this pattern is a feasible method of addressing the original issue
of IoT security, maintainability, and planned-obsolescence with respect to the
analysis in Section 3.6.
5.1 Future Work
There are several areas of future work:
• investigation of the kill switch pattern in the safety-critical domain,
• applicability and adaptation of safety-critical patterns as related to the
MSA domain,
• development of frameworks and tooling for easier implementation of the
kill switch pattern,
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• investigation of implications of the pattern to the cloud domain,
• graph-based dependency tracking and management of microservice ar-
chitecture
We assert that future work in the area of container-based IoT architecture
patterns, accounting for factors such as the ones presented in this thesis, is
important for the adoption of IoT in general. By implementing this pattern on
IoT devices, in conjunction with full microservice architectures, IoT devices can
become more adaptable, secure, and easier to maintain.
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user@b550:~ $ uname -a
Linux b550 5.4.0-52-generic #57-Ubuntu SMP Thu Oct 15 10:57:00 UTC
2020 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
user@b550:~ $ neofetch --off
user@b550
---------
OS: Ubuntu 20.04.1 LTS x86_64
Host: MS-7C95 1.0
Kernel: 5.4.0-52-generic
Uptime: 3 days, 6 hours, 8 mins
Packages: 2448 (dpkg), 6 (flatpak), 12 (snap)
Shell: bash 5.0.17







CPU: AMD Ryzen 7 3700X (16) @ 3.600GHz
GPU: NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1070 Ti
Memory: 12025MiB / 32102MiB
Listing A.1: System information
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A.2 Docker Version





Built: Wed Sep 16 17:02:52 2020
OS/Arch: linux/amd64
Experimental: false
Server: Docker Engine - Community
Engine:
Version: 19.03.13
API version: 1.40 (minimum version 1.12)
Go version: go1.13.15
Git commit: 4484c46d9d












Listing A.2: docker version output
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RUN python3 -m pip install docker
















from pprint import pprint
import logging
import docker





help=’set the suricata eve.json file path’)
parser.add_argument(’rule_path’,







""" Read a file like the Unix command ‘tail‘. Code from https://
stackoverflow.com/questions/44895527/reading-infinite-stream-
tail """








""" Read log (JSON format) and insert data in db """
client = docker.from_env()
rules = rules_json["rules"]
with open(log_path, "r") as log_file:
for line in tail(log_file):
for level, criteria in rules.items():
for c in criteria:
if c in line:
logging.info("Heard alert!\nLevel: {} match:\n{} line
:\n{}".format(level, c, line))
ks.killswitch(client, int(level))














logging.info("rule path does not exist!")
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logging.info("waiting for eve.json file...")
while not os.path.exists(args.eve_path):
time.sleep(1)
logging.info("eve.json file found, continuing...")
logging.debug("Importing rules...")
with open(args.rule_path, "r") as rule_file:
rules_json = json.load(rule_file)
















from pprint import pprint
import docker
from docker.models.containers import Container
def parse_args():















for c in c_list:
if ’level’ in c.attrs[’Labels’]:
curr_val = int(c.attrs[’Labels’][’level’])
if curr_val > curr_max:
curr_max = curr_val
if curr_val < curr_min:
curr_min = curr_val
if curr_val > curr_active and c.attrs[’State’] == ’running
’:
curr_active = curr_val
return curr_min, curr_max, curr_active
def group_by_level(c_list: [Container]):
grouped_c_lists = {}
for c in c_list:
if ’level’ in c.attrs[’Labels’]:
curr_val = int(c.attrs[’Labels’][’level’])






def do_killswitch(c: Container, target_level: int):
state_change = "none"
if ’level’ in c.attrs[’Labels’]:
if int(c.attrs[’Labels’][’level’]) <= target_level:












for c in c_list:
curr_c = client.containers.get(c.id)
# pprint(vars(curr_c))












def killswitch(client: docker.DockerClient, target_level: int):
# establish which levels is active, and the min/max levels
available
min_level, max_level, active_level = find_current_level_stats(
client.containers.list(all=True, sparse=True))
logging.info(
"Min/max/active level: {}/{}/{}".format(min_level, max_level,
active_level))
# group the containers by their level
grouped_c_lists = group_by_level(
client.containers.list(all=True, sparse=True))
# start from lower -> higher levels
if target_level >= active_level:
if target_level > max_level:
logging.info(
"Target level above maximum available level. Verifying
containers are started.")
if target_level == active_level:
logging.info(
"Target level is equal to current level. Verifying
containers are started.")
for level in sorted(grouped_c_lists.keys()):
res = [do_killswitch(c, target_level)
for c in grouped_c_lists[level]]
if level <= target_level:
wait_until_all_running(client, grouped_c_lists[level])
logging.info("Level {} containers state change: ".format(
level))
for k, v in res:
logging.info("container: {} state: {}".format(
k.attrs[’Names’][0], v))
# start from higher -> lower level
else:
for level in sorted(grouped_c_lists.keys(), reverse=True):
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res = [do_killswitch(c, target_level)
for c in grouped_c_lists[level]]
logging.info("Level {} containers state change: ".format(
level))
for k, v in res:
logging.info("container: {} state: {}".format(
k.attrs[’Names’][0], v))
































test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U docker && psql -U docker -lqt





























































id SERIAL PRIMARY KEY,



















#ENTRYPOINT [ "/opt/app/entrypoint.sh" ]
#CMD ["sh", "-c", "node server.js"]
CMD ["sh", "-c", "/opt/app/entrypoint.sh"]
C.5 base-example/lvl1/api/entrypoint.sh
#!/bin/bash




















// set up the db
const Pool = require(’pg’).Pool







const testConn = (request, response) => {









const getTasks = (request, response) => {







const getTaskById = (request, response) => {
const id = parseInt(request.params.id)









const createTask = (request, response) => {
const { task, is_complete } = request.body
pool.query(’INSERT INTO tasks (task, is_complete) VALUES ($1, $2)’,







const updateTasks = (request, response) => {
const id = parseInt(request.params.id)
const { task, is_complete } = request.body
pool.query(
’UPDATE tasks SET task = $1, is_complete = $2 WHERE id = $3’,
[task, is_complete, id],








const deleteTask = (request, response) => {
const id = parseInt(request.params.id)


















const express = require(’express’)
const bodyParser = require(’body-parser’)
const app = express()








app.get(’/’, (request, response) => {









app.listen(process.env.API_PORT, () => {

















until $(curl --output /dev/null --silent --head --fail $API_URI); do
if [ ${attempt_counter} -eq ${max_attempts} ];then











sed -i "s@SERVER_SIDE_GET_BASE@$SERVER_SIDE_GET_BASE@" /usr/share/
nginx/html/index.html
sed -i "s@SERVER_SIDE_GET_TASKS@$SERVER_SIDE_GET_TASKS@" /usr/share/
nginx/html/index.html
sed -i "s@API_URI@$API_URI@" /usr/share/nginx/html/index.html
/usr/share/nginx/pinger.sh &
exec $(which nginx) -c /etc/nginx/nginx.conf -g "daemon off;"
C.11 base-example/lvl2/ui/index.html
<h1>Server Render GET /</h1>
<p>SERVER_SIDE_GET_BASE</p>









# RUN rm /docker-entrypoint.sh




nginx -c /etc/nginx/nginx.conf -g "daemon off;"
C.15 base-example/lvl3/internet-proxy/nginx.conf
#!/bin/bash
nginx -c /etc/nginx/nginx.conf -g "daemon off;"
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# test: ["CMD-SHELL", "curl --silent --fail localhost:9200/





































































RUN apt update && \
apt install -y software-properties-common wget apt-transport-https
# suricata
RUN add-apt-repository -y ppa:oisf/suricata-stable









RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* && apt-get clean && apt autoremove -y











red_print "Updating suricata sources..."
suricata-update update-sources
suricata-update enable-source et/open
suricata-update --enable-conf /etc/suricata/enable.conf --local=/var/
lib/suricata/rules/killswitch.rules
red_print "Starting suricata..."
suricata -D -v -i $IF




alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET -> $HOME_NET ( msg:"Kill switch trigger";
content:"GET"; http_method; content:"KILLSWITCH"; priority:1; )
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